Ohio’s New Law for Mentally Ill Patients Takes Effect on December 1, 1978

Ohio’s New Law for Mentally Ill Patients Takes Effect on December 1, 1978, marks a legal turning point in the proceedings against Billy Milligan: the case had to address not only whether he could participate in his defense, but also whether he was responsible for the charged acts and where he would receive treatment if found not guilty by reason of insanity. The book does not set out the statute’s provisions in detail; it shows its importance through the procedural choices and treatment arrangements that followed.

The Case Before the New Law Took Effect

In January 1978, public defenders Gary Schweickart and Judy Stevenson arranged a psychological evaluation after continuing to represent Milligan despite his attempt to dismiss them. Dr. Willis C. Driscoll tested him on January 8 and 13. Driscoll reported an IQ score of 68, which he attributed in part to depression, and diagnosed acute schizophrenia. His report described severe disruption in Milligan’s sense of identity, difficulty distinguishing himself from his environment, and an inability at that time to understand events or counsel effectively in his own defense.

On January 19, Schweickart and Stevenson presented the report to Judge Jay Flowers to support the claim that Milligan could not assist with his defense. Flowers ordered an examination by the forensic psychiatry unit at Southwest Community Mental Health Center. The defense feared that the center would favor the prosecution and sought protection for anything Milligan might disclose. The parties compromised: prosecutors could question him about incriminating statements made to the court-appointed clinicians only if Milligan testified. This early dispute concerned present capacity to participate in proceedings, not yet the distinct question of his mental state when the offenses occurred.

The Law and Pretrial Arrangements

After the new law took effect on December 1, 1978, the prosecution requested a pretrial meeting with Probate Judge Richard B. Metcalf to clarify procedures under it. Judge Jay Flowers arranged the meeting. The defense understood that its scope would extend beyond procedure: the participants would consider what evidence could be admitted by stipulation and where Milligan would be sent for treatment if he were found not guilty by reason of insanity.

Placement was a practical as well as a clinical question. Harding Hospital was considered unaffordable, so the defense sought a state hospital with relevant expertise. Dr. Cornelia Wilbur recommended Dr. David Caul, medical director of Athens Mental Health Center, as a physician experienced in treating people with multiple personalities. Judy Stevenson contacted Caul about accepting Milligan and attending the meeting. He said he would need approval from hospital superintendent Sue Foster and state officials, but was willing to consider Milligan and travel to Columbus. The treatment destination was therefore under discussion before the court reached its verdict.

Stipulated Evidence and the Verdict

The trial proceeded on stipulated medical evidence. The competing accounts of the offenses remained consequential: Arthur maintained that the women had cooperated, while Judy Stevenson pointed out that all three women contradicted that account and had no contact with one another. Gary Schweickart and Stevenson did not accept the claim of cooperation; they understood Arthur’s account as reflecting Adalana’s perception of what had happened, rather than an established account of the women’s actions.

Judge Flowers dismissed the first rape count, citing the lack of corroborating evidence and the absence of a similar modus operandi. On counts two through ten, he found that the stipulated medical evidence showed Milligan had been mentally ill at the time of the offenses, unable to distinguish right from wrong, and unable to refrain from the acts. With no contrary evidence before him, he found Milligan not guilty by reason of insanity. The ruling addressed criminal responsibility at the time of the charged conduct; it was not simply a repetition of the earlier finding that Milligan could not then assist in his defense.

Later Hospitalization and Significance

The case’s legal and clinical questions continued after the verdict. On December 10, 1979, a court found Milligan to be mentally ill, diagnosed his condition as multiple personality, and determined that hospitalization was warranted. The findings cited substantial impairment in thought, mood, perception, orientation, and memory, along with risks of harm to himself and others and a need for hospital treatment. The decision shows that an insanity acquittal did not itself settle the question of care or release: a further court determination addressed his condition and the need for hospitalization.

The book presents the new law chiefly through this sequence of hearings, evidentiary agreements, verdict, and placement decisions, rather than through a full explanation of statutory language. Its significance in the narrative lies in how it makes distinct legal questions visible: present competence, responsibility at the time of an offense, and the grounds for subsequent hospitalization. The proceedings connect clinical judgments to legal consequences without making diagnosis alone the verdict.